We investigate the information exchange between duopolistic firms in a game theoretical framework.
Introduction
In decision problems under uncertainty, information on uncertain events, i.e., knowledge about what events happened or will happen, influences essentially the optimal strategy of a decision maker and his payoff. The more a decision maker knows about which happened or will happen among possible events, the higher payoff he obtains. That is, more information yields higher payoff in one-person decision problems. In game situations with more than one decision maker, is this also true? In zero-sum two-person games, where two players are completely competitive, it remains true. In non-zero-sum games, however, it is not necessarily true, as Levine and Ponssard [4] and other authors (Basar and Ho [1] , Ho and Blau [3] ) have already pointed out. The As one of economic models typically describing the situations above, lye consider a quantity duopoly model where E!ach of two firms knows his own cost function but not the rival's. The firms produce and supply the same homogeneous commodity noncooperatively. In real economy, the cost functions of firms will be stochastic because their production functions and/or the prices of their materials are fluctuated by some external factor like weather. So, we assume that the marginal costs of the firms are random variables and that each firm can know the realized value of his own marginal cost but not that of the rival's. Since the firms are confronted with uncertainty about each other's cost functions, they must decide their outputs based on their estimates of each other's costs. As the cost function is very important for each firm, he is supposed to keep it secret from the rival. On the contrary to this reasoning, we will show that each firm has an incentive to inform the rival of his cost function, and that two firms agree to inform each other of their cost functions.
In section 2, we describe in detail the duopoly model sketched above.
In section 3, we provide and discuss main results. In section 4, we conclude the paper.
Duopoly Model
Firms land 2 produce and supply thE! same homogeneous commodity. The output of firm i(i=1,2) is denoted by Xi' where Xi is a nonnegative real number. We assume that there is no limit of capacity.
Firm i has a linear cost function
For total output Xl + x 2 ' the price p of the commodity is determined by the linear market demand function
Then firm i obtains the profit max (r,D) for a real number r.
Firms decide their outputs noncooperatively to maximize their profits.
In a real situation, the cost functions of firms and the market demand function will be stochastic. In this paper, we consider the stochastic fluctuation of cost functions only. We assume that the marginal cost c i of firm i(i=l,Z) is a random variable, of which the range space is denoted by C i ' and that both firms know the joint probability distribution F(Cl,c Z ) of cl and c z . As the information condition, each of firms can know the realized value of his own marginal cost but not that of the rival's, when he decides his output.
To give an example of our duopoly model, two firms produce and sell the identical goods under linear production functions without any fluctuation. 
VD is the information structure with which two firms are originally confronted. information structure V is a real-valued bounded measurable function on the V.
Remark 1. Our duopoly model can be formally represented as an extensive game with two stages. In the first stag':, two firms negotiate for the information exchange. As a result, an information structure V of the second stage is determined. The second stage has the following moves:
(1) A chance move selects firms' marginal costs, cl and c 2 ' according to the probability distribution F.
, receiving a message cVi.
1-
The second stage belongs to the class of games with incomplete information introduced by Harsanyi [2] . Then, the supply plan x. [V] of firm i is his -z.
pure strategy in the second stage with the information structure V. The equilibrium point under U is a Nash equilibrium point in this stage.
Main Results
We introduce some notations for two random variables, x and y: F(x), the marginal probability distribution of x; F(x!y), the conditional probability distribution of x, given y; E(x), the expectation of x; E(x!y), the conditional expectation of ;c, given y; V(x), the variance of x; Cov(x,y) , the covariance of x and y.
We assume the following:
where C.
-z.
(B)
(Linear Regression)
The assumption (A) implies that each firm supplies a positive quantity in equilibrium under any information structure. We need the assumption CB) for providing the equilibrium point under VO.
Proof: EJi(X) can be rewritten as 2) (a.e.) .
Then, for some fixed x ., x. maximizes EJ. 
Now, let us put
where m is a non-negative real number. Then, noting that we obtain 
, we can easily show that (2) is equivalent to (1).
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. The unique equilibrium point under vO is given by
The expected equilibrium profit of firm i under VO is given by 3) Supply plans which take the same value almost everywhere are identified.
(5) E(x.lc.) <a/2b (a.e.).
1.-Hence, from Lemma 1, an equilibrium point x*~(x1*,x2*) satisfies
Secondly, we prove that (6) has the unique solution. Let us define a
to itself by
where IX2 -x21 (c 2
We introduce the £l-norm
on the space Xi' Then, from (7),
Similarly we obtain This shows that (6) has the unique solution.
Thirdly, we determine the constants A, B, A and B so that (10)
From (6) for 7:=2, (10) and (14), we have, c.) (a.e.) .
4) follows from (3) and (19).
Lemma 3. The unique equilibrium point under U 1 is given by
The expected equilibrium profits of firms are given by (ZZ)
Proof: Similarly to Lemma 1 and the proof of Lemma Z, we can show that Similarly to the proof of Lemma Z, we obtain (Z7)
Substituting (ZO) into (27) and arranging it, we obtain
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under every information structure, as we can see from (3), (20), (21) and (33). So, in that case, the firms' output pair is at C in equilibrium under every information structure. Figure 2 , both firms decide higher outputs at xO than at X12 and they obtain lower profits.
° 1 2 12
In general, the output pairs X ,X X and X under respective informa- 
Conclusion
We have investigated the information exchange between duopolistic firms in a game theoretical framework. We have shown that each firm has an incentive to inform the other of his cost function, and moreover that they can obtain the highest expected equilibrium profits when they exchange their information about cost functions. From these results, we can say that two firms agree to inform each other of their cost functions.
To conclude this paper, we make some remarks about our model. First, in our model, two firms negotiate for information exchange before their marginal costs are realized. As we have shown, they agree to make the rule that, whichever marginal costs might be realized., obliges them to inform each other of those realized costs. Besides exchanging their information completely like this, it may happen that they do partially, in a sense that each firm informs the other of only some realized values of his marginal cost. For example, when a realized cost of, say, firm 1 is high, firm 2 may wrongly estimate firm l's cost to be lower than the realized value, if he is not informed of it.
Then, based on his wrong estimate, firm 2 will supply the commodity at a low level, so that firm 1 will obtain higher profit. Thus, firm 1 may not disclose his weak point that his realized cost is high. That is, each firm may want ·to inform the other of his marginal cost when it is low, and may not when it is high. In order to make our investigation more detail like this, we will need to reformulate our model so that firms negotiate for information exchange after they know their own marginal costs. Secondly, we have not considered the possibility that a firm may reveal false information to the other after the information exchange agreement is reached. But, his betrayal may be detected by the other in the long run if our model is repeated, and the agreement will be annuled. So, the betrayal does not seem to be profitable for him. Thirdly, in an oligopoly with more than two firms, it seems to be possible that each firm exchanges information with some of others, and thus that some exclusive groups of firms are formed for the purpose of the information exchange. This problem of group formation of oligopolistic firms for the information exchange will be investigated in future papers. Finally, we must note that, if we consider information about demand function, the situation is quite different from ours. Basar and Ho [1] and Ponssard [5] have
shown that each firm obtains the highest expected equilibrium profit when only he is informed of the demand function. Hence, in this case, each firm never has an incentive to communicate his information to the other. These results together with ours show that the problem of information in non-zero-sum games is much more complicated than in one-person decision problems and zero-sum two-person games. The game theoretical viewpoint will be useful to investigate this problem, especially the strategic aspect of information.
